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1 Introduction
Wage indexation is, arguably, relatively rare except in the case of economies with persistent,
highly variable inflation. For instance, in the case of U.S., even the proportion of workers in
“major” union contracts (i.e., those covering 1000 or more workers) with indexation clauses,
while significantly correlated with the prevailing rate of inflation, has stayed below 60 per cent
even during the severest episodes of inflation (Holland (1995)) and very much below that mark
in less inflationary times. While formal statistics about indexation clauses in smaller union
contracts or in the non-union sector are hard to find, as Card (1986) notes (footnote 1, italics
added), “It is generally believed that escalation provisions are rare in the nonunion sector... .
On this basis, perhaps no more than 10 percent of all U.S. workers are covered by cost-of-living
provisions.” That we observe so many wage contracts without any indexation coverage at all,
does not accord well with the standard theory of decision making under uncertainty, assuming
at least one of the parties to the employment contract, the firm or the worker, is risk averse1 and
that there is at least some uncertainty about future inflation. This paper analyzes optimal wage
contracting assuming agents are not subjective expected utility maximizers but are, instead,
ambiguity (or uncertainty) averse decision makers who maximize Choquet expected utility. We
show that such agents will choose not to include any indexation coverage in their wage contracts
unless the perceived inflation uncertainty is high enough, even in the absence of exogenous costs
(e.g., transactions costs) of including indexation links.
Savage’s theory (Savage (1954)) of subjective expected utility maximization (SEU) is the
received paradigm used for modeling decision-making under subjective uncertainty. A main
implication of SEU is that a decision maker (DM) behaves as if her subjective assessment of
likelihoods of uncertain events may be described by a precise and unique probability distribution.
It is often the case, however, that a DM’s knowledge about the likelihood of contingent events is
consistent with more than one probability distribution. But, does how precisely she knows the
relevant odds influence the choice of the typical DM? Ellsberg’s classic contribution (Ellsberg
(1961)) was to show that indeed it does. Ellsberg observed that imprecise information about
odds affected behavior in a pervasive way: most preferred to bet on events with unambiguous
rather than ambiguous odds (including, Savage himself!). People adjusting their decisions
depending on how well they know the relevant odds and acting with greater wariness the more
vague their knowledge of the odds, is a commonly observed attitude, and has been named
ambiguity aversion. Ceteris paribus, an ambiguity averse agent will be averse to acts with
payoffs that are crucially contingent on events about whose odds the agent has a relatively poor
idea of, just as a risk averse agent shies away from risky acts.
Schmeidler (1989), in a pioneering contribution, developed the Choquet expected utility
model (CEU) as one possible formalization of decision behavior that incorporates ambiguity
aversion. The present paper applies this formalization. In the CEU model, as in the closely
related maxmin multiple prior model presented in (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), roughly put,
the agent’s belief is captured not by a unique probability distribution in the standard Bayesian
fashion, but instead by a set of probabilities: the agent’s belief is ambiguous in the sense that
more than one probability is consistent with his knowledge. Thus not only is the outcome of
an act uncertain but also the expected payoff of the action, since the payoff may be measured
with respect to more than one probability. In the CEU model, it is as if an ambiguity averse
decision maker evaluates an act by the minimum expected utility that may be (subjectively)
associated with it.
Suppose that price risk comes in two types. An aggregate price risk, arising from an economy
wide shock (possibly, monetary) that multiplies prices of all goods by the same factor, and
1Results from formal empirical research accords well with casual empiricism in showing that risk aversion is
pervasive in the relevant context. Card (1986, pp S163) reports, “the parameter estimates imply that workers
are substantially more risk averse than owners, although the assumption that owners are risk neutral is rejected
by a conventional test.” See also, Farber (1978).
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specific risks, arising from demand/supply shocks to specific commodities that affects the price
of a single good or a restricted class of goods. A wage contract that is set in purely nominal
terms is susceptible to the aggregate price risk. On the other hand, a contract wherein wages
are fully linked to an index is completely immune from aggregate price risk. Being paid in terms
of an index essentially amounts to being paid units of the reference bundle of goods. However,
typically, the reference bundle, such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI), contains items that
are not part of a given individual’s consumption basket. Hence, an indexed wage contract
unavoidably picks up the specific risks arising from fluctuations in the prices of the goods in
the reference bundle that are not part of the concerned individual’s consumption basket (or the
firms’ production set). On the other hand, a specific risk affecting only such goods would be of
no concern to the agents if they were to fix their transaction purely in nominal terms. Assuming
contracting parties are SEU maximizers and that at least one of them is risk averse, since both
types of risks are pervasive, an optimal wage contract will typically involve partial indexation
(i.e., a certain fraction of wages, strictly greater than zero, will be index linked). With SEU
maximizing agents, seemingly, the standard way to obtain an optimal wage contract that does
not include any indexation coverage would be to assume some exogenous cost to including such
a coverage as, for instance, was done in Gray (1978).2 However, we show in this paper that if
agents are ambiguity averse with CEU preferences and if they have an ambiguous belief about
specific price risks involving goods that are neither in the employee’s consumption basket nor
in the firm’s production set, then zero indexation coverage is optimal so long as the variability
of inflation is anticipated to lie within a certain bound. Significantly, the result obtains without
assuming any exogenous cost of indexation (e.g., transactions or writing costs); the result also
obtains whether or not the belief about the aggregate price risk is ambiguous–as we show, what
is crucial is the ambiguity of belief about specific price risks.
Why might the result be of interest? There is an extensive literature, pioneered by the work
of Gray (1976) and Fischer (1977), which shows that whether or not a macroeconomic policy
maker would wish for an extensive use of wage indexation in the economy depends on certain
circumstances. The relevant sets of circumstances have largely to do with the uncertainty about
different price movements. A theory which endogenously links such uncertainty to the individ-
ual’s decision whether or not to use indexation, would be potentially useful in telling us whether
a policy intervention (to encourage or discourage indexation) is at all necessary, and if so, what
form it should take. But, whether the theory is actually useful would depend crucially on its
plausibility. Even in the most developed nations, information (say, formal forecasts) about rel-
ative price movements are very hard to come by. Pick any two agents in the economy; it is
inevitable that the consumer price index will include goods and services that are not part of the
consumption basket of either agent. For instance, it will inevitably include housing in regions
that the agents have no interest in. It is a plausible assumption that agents will have, at best,
very sparse informal knowledge about possible (relative) price movements of goods and services
that they never consume (or include in any production process they are involved with). Thus,
if agents are typically ambiguity averse when confronted with vague information, as much ex-
perimental evidence suggests (see Camerer (1995)), then it would seem compelling (a priori) to
argue that they would behave in an ambiguity averse manner when acting on beliefs about rel-
ative price movements of goods that never figure in their consumption/production plans, since
these are risks about which they have the least information3. Thus our result rests on a hypoth-
2Jovanovic and Ueda (1997) use a principal agent model with moral hazard and renegotiation to rationalize
nominal wage contracts. In their model, the workers’ effort is not observable; retail sales is the only contractible
signal. They show that their model implies that indexed wage contracts are not renegotiation proof and use this
finding to justify the widespread use of nominal contracts. In comparison, in our model non-indexation arises
even though effort is fully observable. Also, unlike Jovanovic and Ueda (1997), our result relates the presence of
indexation to the uncertainty about inflation.
3It is interesting to note in this context, as reported in Shiller (1997), when asked for reasons for not opting
for indexation many agents say that they are inhibited by their doubts that the government inflation numbers
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esis that is, arguably, plausible. Finally, while there is a vast literature on ambiguity aversion
(see Camerer (1995)), and indeed of the many other departures from SEU, that convincingly
establishes both, the theoretical sophistication of the ideas as well as their importance in labo-
ratory settings, this work has had little impact on the way that economics is done. In large part
this is because there have been few demonstrations that economically important phenomena,
that are only poorly understood on the basis of standard theory, can be understood better by
using models other than the standard one (SEU).4 This paper is a contribution that hopes to
go some way in bridging this gap, especially as a complement to the finding in Mukerji and
Tallon (2000) which shows that ambiguity aversion (with CEU preferences) may help to explain
why we see so little trade in indexed bonds. In that paper we considered a model of general
market equilibrium with price taking agents, involving simultaneous clearing of financial and
commodity markets and showed that a result similar to that in this paper held: if uncertainty
about inflation stayed below a bound, indexed bonds would not be traded in any equilibrium,
given qualifications with regard to ambiguous beliefs about shocks affecting relative prices. The
framework in the present paper is one of bilateral contracting, not a market environment like in
Mukerji and Tallon (2000). Hence, the result here does not follow from the result in the other
paper. Selecting an optimal contract is, in terms of the mathematical modeling in this paper,
simply a static programming problem. In the other paper the (financial) contract of interest
was a general equilibrium outcome (and, as it happened, an equilibrium that is not Pareto
optimal, given that the markets were incomplete). As we understand it, the same intuition
explains both results, a point that is significant in so far as it shows that the intuition is robust
across seemingly different environments. However, we also think, the non-market framework
in this paper (which facilitates the programming solution) is useful in rendering the intuition
more transparent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces a few necessary
preliminaries about the Choquet expected utility model of ambiguity aversion. Section 3 ex-
plains the model and the results. Section 4 concludes. The Appendix contains the formal proofs
of the propositions.
2 Choquet expected utility
Let Ω = {ωi}
N
i=1 be a finite state space, and assume that the decision maker (DM) chooses
among acts with state contingent payoffs, f : Ω → R. In the CEU model ( Schmeidler (1989))
an ambiguity averse DM’s subjective belief is represented by a convex capacity (or a convex
non-additive probability function), ν : 2Ω → [0, 1], such that, (i) ν(∅) = 0, (ii) ν(Ω) = 1 and,
(iii) ν(X ∪ Y ) ≥ ν(X) + ν(Y ) − ν(X ∩ Y ), for all X, Y ⊂ Ω. Define the core of ν, (notation:
∆ (Ω) is the set of all additive probability measures on Ω):
C (ν) = {ψ ∈ ∆(Ω) | ψ(X) ≥ ν(X), for all X ⊂ Ω.}
Hence, ν(X) = minψ∈C(ν) ψ(X), may be interpreted as the lower envelope of the set C (ν) . The
ambiguity of belief of an event X is given by
A (X; ν) ≡ max
ψ∈C(ν)
ψ(X)− min
ψ∈C(ν)
ψ(X).
Like in SEU, a utility function u : R+ → R, u
′ (·) ≥ 0, describes DM’s attitude to risk and
wealth. Given a convex non-additive probability ν, the Choquet expected utility of an act is
were valid for their individual circumstances (pp 183, 188-190, 208). Apparently, the concern was that the official
price index referred to a basket of goods that was possibly different from the individual’s.
4Though, lately, the list of papers exploring the implications of the idea of ambiguity aversion in economic
context, has been growing. For example, see Dow and Werlang (1992), Epstein and Wang (1994), Hansen,
Sargent, and Tallarini (1999), Hansen, Sargent, Turmuhambetova, and Williams (2001), Tallon (1998), Mukerji
(1998), Mukerji and Tallon (2001).
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simply the minimum of all possible ‘standard’ expected utility values obtained by measuring
the contingent utilities possible from the act with respect to each of the additive probabilities
in the core of ν:
CEνu (f) = min
ψ∈C(ν)
{∑
ω∈Ω
u (f (ω))ψ (ω)
}
The Choquet expectation of an act is just its standard expectation calculated with respect to
a ‘minimizing probability’ corresponding to this act. Hence, in the Choquet method the DM’s
appraisal is not only informed by his knowledge of the odds but is also adjusted downwards
to “correct” for the perceived imprecision of his knowledge.5 The fact that the same additive
probability (in the core of relevant non-additive probability) will not in general ‘minimize’ the
expectation for two different acts, explains why the Choquet expectations operator, unlike the
standard operator, is not additive, i.e., given any acts f and g : CEν(f)+CEν(g) ≤ CEν(f +g).
In our analysis, we will need to consider the independent product of capacities. The indepen-
dent product of two convex capacities ν1 and ν2, ν1 ⊗ ν2, (suggested in Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989)) is the lower envelope of the set whose generic element is the product of two probabilities,
selecting one probability from the core of one capacity and the other probability from the core
of the other capacity.
3 The optimal wage contract
3.1 The model
We consider a model of a wage contract between a firm and an employee. The contract is for
a transaction that would take place at a future date: the employee will deliver a unit of labor
and, in turn, be paid a wage by the firm as compensation. At the point of signing the contract
there is some uncertainty about what commodity prices will prevail at the future date (when the
transaction takes place). Since commodity prices determine the real wage, the price uncertainty
is of concern to both parties to the contract. To address the concern, the contract may set the
wage wholly or partially in terms of a given commodity price index. While the particular index
used is given exogenously, how much of the wage to set in nominal terms and how much to set
in terms of the index is the key decision variable in the contract and the focus of our analysis.
Apart from labor, there are three goods in the model: good x, the only good consumed
by the employee, good y, the output of the firm, and good z, which though not a part of the
employee’s consumption plans or the firm’s production plans, does nevertheless figure in the
bundle of goods whose prices are tracked by the given index. There are two sources of price
uncertainty. The first source is an aggregate price shock, which multiplies all prices by the same
factor. The shock consists of one of two possible realizations of this factor: high (λH) or low (λL)
depending on, say, whether the money supply is high or low, respectively. The second source
of price uncertainty is a (sector) specific shock, idiosyncratic to the production/consumption
of z, which causes the price of good z to be higher or lower independent of the realization of
aggregate shock. The uncertain environment for the firm and the employee is summarized by
four states, characterized by the realizations of the two shocks on the prices of the three goods.
The four states comprising the relevant state space Ω = {ω|ω = 1, 2, 3, 4} and the corresponding
prices are described in the following table:
State Prices
1
(
λLpx, λLpy, λLp
l
z
)
2
(
λLpx, λLpy, λLp
h
z
)
3
(
λHpx, λHpy, λHp
l
z
)
4
(
λHpx, λHpy, λHp
h
z
)
5See Mukerji (1998) (section 1) and Mukerji (1997) for more on this intuition.
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In the table, the price triple corresponding to each state shows, in order, the prices of x, y
and z, in that state. We use the superscripts l and h, respectively, to indicate a low and a high
realization of the specific shock to the price of z. For instance, at state 1 the aggregate shock
is low, as is the specific shock (to the price of z). Consistent with our discussion, we assume
phz ≥ p
l
z and λH ≥ λL.
We assume that the firm produces a fixed amount of good y and uses one unit of labor. Let
wN denote (part of) the wage paid by the firm in nominal units and let wI denote the part paid
in units of the indexation bundle. The indexation bundle is made up of a unit of each good.
Firm’s real profit (in terms of good y) in state ω, piω, is given by:
piω = y −
wN
λωpy
−
λω(px + py + p
ω
z )wI
λωpy
= y −
wN
λωpy
−
(px + py + p
ω
z )wI
py
(1)
where λ1 = λ2 = λL, λ
3 = λ4 = λH , p
1
z = p
3
z = p
l
z, p
2
z = p
4
z = p
h
z . The expression in (1) shows
real profit as the residual output left after taking into account the output needed to pay the
contracted wage. We will assume that the firm is risk neutral and will take that the firm’s
objective is to maximize its expectation (evaluated in a manner to be explained below) of this
real profit. We model the objective function using real profit, rather than the nominal profit, in
order that the function not be subject to money illusion.6 The firm’s decision variables are wN
and wI . The firm’s decision, though, does have to satisfy some additional constraints arising
from considerations affecting the employee’s welfare.
The employee consumes good x using the wage earned. The disutility of the unit of labor
to be delivered is denoted by u, u > 0. The employee’s utility function, a function of the
consumption of x, is denoted u (x). We assume that the employee is risk averse, hence: u′ > 0
and u′′ < 0. The employee’s budget constraint in state ω is given by:
λωpxx
ω = wN + λ
ω(px + py + p
ω
z )wI
⇒ xω =
wN + λ
ω(px + py + p
ω
z )wI
λωpx
(2)
We now turn to the specification of the firm’s and the employee’s beliefs.
3.2 The case where both firm and employee are ambiguity averse
Agents have common beliefs about the price uncertainty. To allow for the beliefs to be am-
biguous, beliefs about the two types of shocks to prices are given, respectively, by two sets of
(marginal) probabilities. First, consider the aggregate shock, which fixes the realization of λω.
Let the minimum and maximum (marginal) probability on λL, consistent with the agents’ knowl-
edge, be µ
L
and µL, respectively, with µL ≤ µL. Correspondingly, the minimum and maximum
(marginal) probabilities on λH are the complementary probabilities, 1− µL and 1− µL. Next,
consider the sector specific shock. Analogously, we let the minimum and maximum (marginal)
probability on plz be νl and νl, respectively, with νl ≤ νl. The minimum and maximum proba-
bilities define the sets of marginal probabilities. We may denote these sets of probabilities more
compactly using the capacities µ (·) and ν (·), where µ (λL) = µL, µ (λH) = 1− µL, ν(p
l
z) = νl,
6The “right” index to deflate the firm’s profit should, arguably, comprise of prices corresponding to goods in
the basket consumed by the firm’s owner/employer. The results in the paper would go through if we deflated
the profit with an index more “tailored” to the employer’s welfare, so long as the price index used in the wage
contract referred to a basket of commodities that included at least one commodity that did not directly affect the
welfare of either party to the contract. In other words, the official price index, i.e., the one used in the contract,
has to refer to at least one good that is neither consumed by the employee nor the employer. So, for instance,
we could have deflated the firm’s profit by the price of good x, the only good consumed by the employee, if that
were the only good the employer also cared about. However, since the owner’s utility does not arise directly
anywhere in the model it seemed more appropriate to use the price of the only good that explicitly arises in the
firm’s production plans, the output, instead.
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ν(phz ) = 1−νl. The common belief on the overall state space Ω is given by the product capacity
µ ⊗ ν. Both the firm and the employee maximize Choquet expected utility given these beliefs
and the respective payoffs given the contract. Notice, the model collapses to SEU once we set
µ
L
= µL and νl = νl.
The firm chooses the wage contract that maximizes the Choquet expectation of real profits
piω, given the belief µ⊗ ν, provided that the contracted wages are non-negative and satisfy the
employee’s participation constraint. Hence, the optimal wage contract solves the program (3),
below, wherein piω and xω are as given in (1) and (2), respectively:
MaxwN ,wI CEµ⊗νpi
ω
s.t

(i) CEµ⊗νu(x
ω) ≥ u
(ii) wI ≥ 0
(iii) wN ≥ 0
(3)
Notice, the two parties “rank” every pair of states in the opposite way; if profit in state i
is greater than that in state j, consumption is greater in state j as compared to state i. The
firm is better off higher the general inflation and worse off higher the price of z; precisely the
opposite is true for the worker. Knowing the ranking of states by each party, we may deduce
which (additive) probability (from the core of the capacity describing the common belief) each
party effectively “chooses” to evaluate its expectation. Let µ represent the two point (additive)
probability distribution (µL, 1− µL) and let µ represent the two point probability distribution
(µ
L
, 1− µ
L
). Similarly, let ν represent the two point probability (νl, 1− νl) and let ν represent
the two point probability (νl, 1 − νl). It follows, from the way the firm ranks states, that it
is as if the firm evaluates expected profits “using” the product probability µ× ν. To see why
this is so notice that the firm, given a particular realization of the specific shock, is worse off
when inflation is lower (i.e., when λω = λL rather than when λ
ω = λH); while, conditional
on the monetary shock, the firm is worse off when price of z is high (λωphz ) rather than low
(λωplz). Next note µ, compared to µ, puts greater probability weight on λL (and less on λH).
Also, ν compared to ν, puts greater probability weight on phz (and less on p
l
z). Hence, the
product probability in the core of the product capacity µ ⊗ ν which minimizes the evaluation
of Epiω is µ× ν. Analogously, the ranking of states by the employee implies that the employee
evaluates expected utility “using” the probability µ × ν, since that is the product probability
in the core of the product capacity µ ⊗ ν which minimizes Eu(xω). The intuitive point is
that each agent, given CEU preferences, evaluates payoffs using that probability, from the set
of probabilities consistent with the common information, that makes the evaluation “robust”
against the possible variation in the probabilities. Given that the agents’ payoffs rank states
differently, the probability distribution that meets the “robustness check” for each agent is
a different one. The description of the program the contract optimizes as given in (3) may
therefore be rewritten in terms of “standard” probabilities and “standard”expectation operators
as follows:
MaxwN ,wI Eµ×νpi
ω
s.t

(i) Eµ×νu(x
ω) ≥ u
(ii) wI ≥ 0
(iii) wN ≥ 0
(4)
Being able to write the optimization program for the contract as in (4) means we may analyze
the program using very standard tools, without having to refer any further to the arithmetic
of Choquet integrals. An analysis of the properties of the solution to (4) yields Proposition
1. The proposition considers a situation wherein the level of inflation is uncertain (i.e., it is
variable). The ambiguity of belief of the event where plz obtains is given by νl − νl, and since
ν is a capacity on a doubleton state-space we may refer to νl − νl as the ambiguity of ν, A (ν).
Proposition 1 explains the relationship between the ambiguity of belief about the price of z and
no indexation. Part (a) shows a high enough ambiguity on ν is sufficient for no indexation to
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be optimal even when there is uncertainty about inflation (i.e., λH
λL
> 1); however, there exists
a level of inflation such that if the range of possible inflation is bounded below this level a high
enough ambiguity on ν will be sufficient to cause no-indexation. Part (b) of Proposition 1 shows,
given that inflation is believed to be variable, ambiguity on ν is necessary for no-indexation to
be optimal. Or, more formally:
Proposition 1 Consider the optimization program posed in (4). Let A (ν) ≡ νl − νl and let
κ ≡ λH
λL
be such that κ > 1.
(a) There exist A¯ and κ¯, 1 > A¯ > 0, such that if κ ≤ κ¯ and A (ν) > A¯, then wI = 0 at any
solution to the optimization program.
(b) Let (wI , wN ) be a solution to the optimization program. At such a solution wI = 0 only if
A (ν) > 0.
Next we discuss an intuition for the main aspects of the result. First consider a situation
wherein there is some uncertainty about inflation (i.e., κ > 1), and about the price of z, but
there is no associated ambiguity (i.e., A (ν) = A (µ) = 0). In other words, the common belief
is described by a (standard) probability. Take a contract where the wage is set completely
in nominal terms, i.e., wI = 0 and consider the benefits and costs of introducing a marginal
unit of indexation into this contract. Note, given the completely nominal contract, the risk
averse worker is exposed to the inflation uncertainty to the fullest extent but is not exposed at
all to the risk in the price of z. Indexation would insure the worker against the inflation risk
but expose the worker to the risk involving pz. At the margin being considered, the ratio of
worker’s marginal utility to the firm’s marginal utility (the latter may be normalized to unity
since the firm is risk neutral) is greater when λω = λH compared to when λ
ω = λL; whereas,
the ratio is constant across changes in pz, conditional on the aggregate price shock. Thus,
introducing a marginal amount of indexation would enable “gains from trade” to be generated
by reallocating resource from the firm to the worker when λω = λH and in the reverse direction
when λω = λL. Hence, introducing indexation would cause a Pareto improvement. As more
indexation is introduced, the gap between ratios of marginal utilities across states differing in
aggregate price shocks becomes smaller, thereby lessening the marginal gains from indexation.
Simultaneously, however, the worker becomes more and more exposed to risk from pz. Resources
are reallocated towards the worker when pz is high and away from the worker when pz is low.
Since resources are allocated towards worker when the ratio of the worker’s to the firms’s
marginal utility is lower, there is a consequent “loss from trade”. This is the marginal cost of
indexation, which rises as more indexation is introduced. As usual, optimal indexation occurs at
the point the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits. However, at the initial margin, where
wI = 0, the marginal benefit is positive while the marginal cost is zero. Hence, the optimal
amount of indexation must be strictly positive.
Next, suppose that A (ν) > 0 but A (µ) = 0. There is no ambiguity of belief about the
inflation uncertainty but there is ambiguity about the uncertainty concerning the price of z.
Consider the same thought exercise as in the preceding paragraph, that is the benefits and costs
of introducing a marginal amount of indexation at the margin where wI = 0, all wage is nominal
and κ > 1. Exactly as before, introducing a marginal amount of indexation would enable gains
from trade to be generated by reallocating resource from the firm to the worker when λω = λH
and in the reverse direction when λω = λL. But now, unlike in the previous case, the marginal
cost is positive even at this initial margin. To understand this, first note that even though
ratios of marginal utilities do not differ across pz shocks, the firm evaluates the expected value
of the transfer by attaching a higher probability weight to the event where pz is higher. But the
worker evaluates expectation by attaching a higher weight where pz is lower. Effectively, then,
because of the use of different probability weights, the ratios of marginal valuations differ across
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the different pz shocks. Also, the transfer is in the “perverse”direction, i.e., from the firm when
its marginal valuation is relatively higher. Thus unless the marginal gains are high enough, i.e.,
unless the risk due to aggregate price shock is big enough, the marginal costs swamp marginal
benefits even at the initial margin and it is optimal to not introduce any indexation at all.
Finally, to see that it is ambiguity about the price of z which is crucial and that ambiguity
about the aggregate price shock does not matter for the no indexation result, reconsider the
thought exercise with A (ν) = 0 but A (µ) > 0. In this case, the marginal costs work out exactly
as in the case with A (ν) = A (µ) = 0. But marginal benefits (of indexation) are actually
greater! Now, the firm evaluates expected transfers by putting a relatively low probability
weight when λω = λH and the worker evaluates expected utility (or consumption) by putting
a relatively low probability weight when λω = λL. Exactly as before, introducing a marginal
amount of indexation would enable gains from trade to be generated by reallocating resource
from the firm to the worker when λω = λH and in the reverse direction when λ
ω = λL, but now
the gains are greater because not only are the ratios of marginal utilities aligned the “right”
way but the disparity in probability weights is also such that the “giver” values the resource
less than the “receiver”.7
A final point about the logic of the result that is worth clarifying is that it obtains whether
or not the principal, i.e., the employer is ambiguity averse. To this end we consider, in the
following subsection the case where the firm has probabilistic belief (i.e., is ambiguity neutral)
and show that the result holds in this case too.
3.3 The case of an ambiguity neutral firm
It might be argued that firms are better informed than workers and may have more objective
information, or at the least, consider and process information more objectively. Hence, it is
worth considering how the model works out if we were to assume that only the worker is
ambiguity averse while the firm is an expected value maximizer with a probabilistic belief. (We
assume, as before, that the firm is risk neutral.) In what follows we reconsider the model
presented in the last section by amending beliefs accordingly. More specifically, we assume that
the firm “knows” the “true” probability governing the states, while the worker contemplates
a set of probabilities centered around this true probability. Thus it is as if the firm and the
worker’s beliefs are informed of the same empirical regularity, but while the firm’s information
about the regularity is relatively precise the worker’s information is more ambiguous.
Accordingly, we assume the firm has probabilistic beliefs (m, 1−m) on (λL, λH) and (n, 1−n)
on (plz, p
h
z ) with 1 > m > 0 and 1 > n > 0. (With slight abuse of notation, m and n will also
be used to denote these (two point) probability distributions.) The worker is not sure that
the true probabilities are m and n. He entertains as possible two sets of probabilities, each
symmetrically “centered” around one of these two reference distributions. More formally, the
employee’s belief on the states λL, λH is given by the set C (λL, λH) specified as follows (△
denotes the two dimensional unit simplex):
C (λL, λH) ≡
{(
m′ (λL) ,m
′ (λH)
)
∈ △ | m′ (λL) ≥ (1−A)m (λL) ;m
′ (λH) ≥ (1−A)m (λH)
}
.
(5)
Similarly, the employee’s beliefs on the states plz, p
h
z is given by the set C
(
plz, p
h
z
)
specified as
follows:
C
(
plz, p
h
z
)
≡
{(
n′
(
plz
)
, n′
(
phz
))
∈ △ | n′
(
plz
)
≥ (1−A)n
(
plz
)
; n′
(
phz
)
≥ (1−A)n
(
phz
)}
.
(6)
7In this special case, where A (ν) = 0 but A (µ) > 0, if A (µ) is large enough, it is possible that wN = 0 in the
optimal solution. However, this is an artefact of a simplifying assumption that we made, that the worker has no
obligation (like house rent) that is contracted (at least partly) in nominal terms, or any other source of income
(returns from savings) that is (at least partly) set in nominal terms.
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Let us now represent the beliefs of the ambiguity averse worker given in (5) and (6) in terms
of the capacities µ and ν where µ (λL) = µL, µ (λH) = 1− µL, ν(p
l
z) = νl, ν(p
h
z ) = 1− νl. The
capacities take the following simple form:
µ(λL) = (1−A)m(λL), µ(λH) = (1−A)m(λH);
ν(plz) = (1−A)n(p
l
z), ν(p
h
z ) = (1−A)n(p
h
z ).
Thus, the decision maker allows for (symmetric) deviation from the reference probability by a
factor 1−A. Note that A is the ambiguity parameter in this case. The value A = 1 corresponds
to extreme pessimism while A = 0 corresponds to probabilistic beliefs, i.e., ambiguity neutrality.
As before, the employee’s belief on Ω is given by µ⊗ ν.8
As in the previous section, the firm chooses the wage contract that maximizes the Choquet
expectation of real profits piω, given the belief m×n, provided that the contracted wages are non-
negative and satisfy the employee’s participation constraint. Hence, the optimal wage contract
solves the program (7), below, wherein piω and xω are as given in (1) and (2), respectively:
MaxwN ,wI CEm×npi
ω
s.t

(i) CEµ⊗νu(x
ω) ≥ u
(ii) wI ≥ 0
(iii) wN ≥ 0
(7)
Given the worker’s ranking of the states, the description of the program the contract op-
timizes as given in (7) may therefore be rewritten in terms of “standard” probabilities and
“standard”expectation operators as follows:
MaxwN ,wI Em×npi
ω
s.t

(i) Eµ×νu(x
ω) ≥ u
(ii) wI ≥ 0
(iii) wN ≥ 0
(8)
Proposition 2 Consider the optimization program posed in (8). Let A (ν) ≡ νl − νl and let
κ ≡ λH
λL
be such that κ > 1.
(a) There exist A¯ and κ¯, 1 > A¯ > 0, such that if κ ≤ κ¯ and A > A¯, then wI = 0 at any
solution to the optimization program.
(b) Let (wI , wN ) be a solution to the optimization program. At such a solution, wI = 0 only
if A > 0.
Hence, Proposition 2 establishes that the results proved in the previous subsection are robust
to modification of the firm’s attitude towards ambiguity. The intuition for this case is almost
identical to the case where both the firm and employee had a common ambiguous belief. To
see this, think again of the intuition for the case where A (ν) > 0 but A (µ) = 0. The crucial
point there was that the marginal cost of introducing indexation was positive even at the initial
margin, where wI = 0. This was so because the firm evaluates expected value by attaching a
higher probability weight to the event where pz is higher while the employee attaches a higher
weight where pz is lower. However, this difference in the way expectations are evaluated by the
firm and the employee is true even with our new specification of beliefs. Hence, the old intuition
still applies. Finally, it is worth reiterating the point mentioned in footnote 8: the same result
holds whenever the employee’s beliefs are ambiguous and encompass the probabilistic beliefs of
the firm.
8A more general way of specifying the employee’s beliefs would have been to assume that they are given by
any convex capacity whose core contains the probabilistic beliefs of the firm. This much commonality of beliefs
between the firm and the employee is all that is needed to obtain the formal proposition. The assumption that
the sets of belief are symmetric/“centered”, as in (5) and (6), enables us to avoid notational clutter the more
general form will necessarily bring.
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4 Conclusion
Thus, we see that ambiguity averse agents with CEU preferences will write completely unindexed
wage contracts even when inflation is uncertain, as long as the uncertainty about inflation is
not too high. The crucial link in the syllogism is the ambiguous uncertainty about relative
price shocks. More precisely, it is the ambiguity about price shocks specific to those goods
which, while included in the indexation bundle, do not otherwise concern the parties to the
contract.9 To the macroeconomic policy maker, economy wide indexation is a “bad thing”
when relative price shocks (or, real shocks, as opposed to monetary shocks) are significant. The
result in this paper suggests that if the variability of relative prices is high, decision making
at the “micro level” will result in less indexation. Thus there is a congruence between micro
motives and macro policy imperatives. Of course, if one would want to promote indexation
for other reasons, one way to do that, if one believed in the theory presented here, would be
to create price indices that are more local and specialized. The result in the paper also seems
to imply that indexing provisions are likely to appear in longer term contracts, since inflation
is likely to be more variable over the longer term.10 Casual empiricism suggests, large union
contracts typically involve longer terms than small union/non-union contracts. Perhaps, this
explains why it is the larger union contracts which have indexation clauses.
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Consider the first order condition (FOC) for the maximization program in (4). Let γu, γI , γN
be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (i), (ii), (iii).
(a) We look at the FOC at wI = 0. At this point, we know that wN has to be strictly
positive to satisfy the participation constraint (i), and hence the associated multiplier, γN , is
zero. Thus, the FOC can be written as follows: Eµ×ν
[
1
λωpy
]
= γuEµ×ν
[
1
λωpx
u′ (xω)
]
Eµ×ν
[
(px+py+pωz )
py
]
= γuEµ×ν
[
px+py+pωz
px
u′ (xω)
]
+ γI
(9)
We may rearrange terms in (9), to get (10), below:
γu =
Eµ×ν
[
1
λωpy
]
Eµ×ν
[
1
λωpx
u′(xω)
]
γI = −γuEµ×ν
[
px+py+pωz
px
u′ (xω)
]
+ Eµ×ν
[
(px+py+pωz )
py
] (10)
We now study the sign of γI . Substituting the expression for γu obtained in the first equality
in (10) into the second equality in (10) we obtain the following expression for γI :
γI = −
Eµ×ν
[
1
λωpy
]
Eµ×ν
[
1
λωpx
u′ (xω)
]Eµ×ν [px + py + pωz
px
u′ (xω)
]
+ Eµ×ν
[
(px + py + p
ω
z )
py
]
(11)
9In the analysis the indexation bundle was exogenously given. This can be relaxed considerably without af-
fecting the result. The restriction that is necessary is that none of the available indexation bundles are completely
relation specific. In other words, if in any index that contracting parties may choose to refer to is such that at
least one good included in the index is not of interest to either party, then the no-indexation result goes through.
10This hypothesis was also analyzed in Gray (1978). That analysis showed that if there was a exogenous, fixed
per period cost of including indexation clauses, there will exist a “cut-off” contract length above which index
clauses will be incorporated and below which they will not. The present paper shows how such a cost may arise
endogenously, due to ambiguity aversion.
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Since wI = 0 implies that p
ω
z and x
ω are independent, the expression on the r.h.s. of (11) may
be simplified to yield,
γI = −
(
1
py
)
Eµ×ν
[
1
λω
]
Eµ×ν
[
1
λω
u′ (xω)
]Eµ×ν [px + py + pωz ] Eµ×ν [u′ (xω)]
+
(
1
py
)
Eµ×ν [(px + py + p
ω
z )] (12)
Rearranging terms on r.h.s of the equality displayed above, it can be seen that the sign of γI is
the same as that of (13), below:
−
Eµ×ν
[
1
λω
]
Eµ×ν [u
′ (xω)]
Eµ×ν
[
1
λω
u′ (xω)
] + Eµ×ν [(px + py + pωz )]
Eµ×ν [px + py + pωz ]
(13)
Now, observe that if λL = λH ,
Eµ×ν
[
1
λω
]
Eµ×ν [u
′ (xω)]
Eµ×ν
[
1
λω
u′ (xω)
] = 1.
Furthermore, νl − νl
Eµ×ν [(px + py + p
ω
z )]
Eµ×ν [px + py + pωz ]
=
px + py + νlp
l
z + (1− νl)p
h
z
px + py + (1− νl)plz + νlp
h
z
.
Hence, if νl = 0 and νl = 1, then,
Eµ×ν [(px + py + p
ω
z )]
Eµ×ν [px + py + pωz ]
=
px + py + p
h
z
px + py + plz
> 1.
So, in the extreme case in which λL = λH and νl = 0 and νl = 1,
−
Eµ×ν
[
1
λω
]
Eµ×ν [u
′ (xω)]
Eµ×ν
[
1
λω
u′ (xω)
] + Eµ×ν [(px + py + pωz )]
Eµ×ν [px + py + pωz ]
= −1 +
Eµ×ν [(px + py + p
ω
z )]
Eµ×ν [px + py + pωz ]
> 0 (14)
As a result, in this extreme case, the FOC are satisfied at wI = 0 and wN such that the
participation constraint of the household is just met, i.e., for these values of wages, we can find
non-negative Lagrange multipliers such that the FOC of the maximization problem are satisfied.
Now, by continuity, the expression on the l.h.s. of (14) remains positive whenever λL is close
to λH and ε > νl > 0 and 1− ε
′ < νl < 1, for ε, ε
′ small enough.
Given that u(.) is strictly concave, the programming problem (4) admits a unique solution.
Hence, since we exhibited a solution to (4) at which wI = 0, the assertion in part (a) of the
proposition follows.
(b) Let us suppose that wI = 0 and A (ν) = 0, i.e., νl = νl ≡ ν˜. Now, following on from
(13), substituting in ν˜ in place of νl and νl, we see that the sign of γI is the same as that of the
expression below
−
Eµ×ν˜
[
1
λω
]
Eµ×ν˜ [u
′ (xω)]
Eµ×ν˜
[
1
λω
u′ (xω)
] + Eµ×ν˜ [(px + py + pωz )]
Eµ×ν˜ [px + py + pωz ]
= −
Eµ×ν˜
[
1
λω
]
Eµ×ν˜ [u
′ (xω)]
Eµ×ν˜
[
1
λω
u′ (xω)
] + 1,
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since,
Eµ×ν˜ [(px + py + p
ω
z )] = Eν˜ [(px + py + p
ω
z )] = Eµ×ν˜ [px + py + p
ω
z ] .
Now, we want to show that
Eµ×ν˜[ 1λω ]Eµ×ν˜ [u
′(xω)]
Eµ×ν˜[ 1λω u′(xω)]
> 1. Since, by hypothesis wI = 0, we get that
xω = wN
λωpx
. Hence, 1
λω
and u′ (xω) are negatively correlated, which implies,
Eµ×ν˜
[
1
λω
]
Eµ×ν˜
[
u′ (xω)
]
> Eµ×ν˜
[
1
λω
u′ (xω)
]
.
But notice,
Eµ×ν˜
[
1
λω
]
= Eµ
[
1
λω
]
≥ Eµ
[
1
λω
]
= Eµ×ν˜
[
1
λω
]
.
Hence
Eµ×ν˜[ 1λω ]Eµ×ν˜ [u
′(xω)]
Eµ×ν˜[ 1λω u′(xω)]
> 1 and therefore γI < 0. Thus we reach a contradiction, in the sense
that both wI = 0 and A (ν) = 0 cannot be true. Since A (ν) cannot be negative by definition,
if wI = 0 the only possibility is that A (ν) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. (The proof works in the same manner as the proof of Proposition
1 and we therefore only sketch the argument.) Consider the first order condition (FOC) for the
maximization program in (8). Let γu, γI , γN be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
constraints (i), (ii), (iii).
(a) We look at the FOC at wI = 0. At this point, we know that wN has to be strictly
positive to satisfy the participation constraint (i), and hence the associated multiplier, γN , is
zero. Thus, the FOC yield:
γu =
Em×n
[
1
λωpy
]
Eµ×ν
[
1
λωpx
u′(xω)
]
γI = −γuEµ×ν
[
px+py+pωz
px
u′ (xω)
]
+ Em×n
[
(px+py+pωz )
py
] (15)
We now study the sign of γI . Proceeding as in the proof of proposition 1 it can be seen that
the sign of γI (when wI = 0) is the same as that of (16), below:
−
Em×n
[
1
λω
]
Eµ×ν [u
′ (xω)]
Eµ×ν
[
1
λω
u′ (xω)
] + Em×n [(px + py + pωz )]
Eµ×ν [px + py + pωz ]
(16)
Now, observe that if λ is constant, i.e., λL = λH , we get that
Em×n
[
1
λω
]
Eµ×ν [u
′ (xω)]
Eµ×ν
[
1
λω
u′ (xω)
] = 1.
Furthermore,
Em×n [(px + py + p
ω
z )]
Eµ×ν [px + py + pωz ]
=
px + py + np
l
z + (1− n)p
h
z
px + py + (1− ν)plz + νp
h
z
=
px + py + np
l
z + (1− n)p
h
z
px + py + (1− (1−A)n)plz + (1−A)np
h
z
.
Hence, if A = 1, then,
Em×n [(px + py + p
ω
z )]
Eµ×ν [px + py + pωz ]
=
px + py + np
l
z + (1− n)p
h
z
px + py + plz
> 1.
(since by assumption n is different from one).
So, in the extreme case in which λL = λH and A = 1,
−
Em×n
[
1
λω
]
Eµ×ν [u
′ (xω)]
Eµ×ν
[
1
λω
u′ (xω)
] + Em×n [(px + py + pωz )]
Eµ×ν [px + py + pωz ]
= −1 +
Em×n [(px + py + p
ω
z )]
Eµ×ν [px + py + pωz ]
> 0 (17)
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As a result, in this extreme case, the FOC are satisfied at wI = 0 and wN such that the
participation constraint of the employee is just met, i.e., for these values of wages, we can find
non-negative Lagrange multipliers such that the FOC of the maximization problem are satisfied.
Now, by continuity, the expression on the l.h.s. of (17) remains positive whenever λL is close
to λH and A¯ < A < 1, for A¯ close to 1.
Given that u(.) is strictly concave, the programming problem (8) admits a unique solution.
Hence, since we exhibited a solution to (8) at which wI = 0, the assertion in part (a) of
Proposition 2 follows.
(b) Let us suppose that wI = 0 and A = 0, that is, µ and ν are now two probability
distributions and, more precisely, µ = m and ν = n. Now, following on from (16), substituting
in n in place of ν and m in place of µ, we see that the sign of γI is the same as that of the
expression below
−
Em×n
[
1
λω
]
Em×n [u
′ (xω)]
Em×n
[
1
λω
u′ (xω)
] + Em×n [(px + py + pωz )]
Em×n [px + py + pωz ]
= −
Em×n
[
1
λω
]
Em×n [u
′ (xω)]
Em×n
[
1
λω
u′ (xω)
] + 1,
Following the same argument as in the proof of (b) of proposition 1, it can be shown that
both wI = 0 and A = 0 cannot be true, since it would otherwise imply that γI is negative.
Hence, if wI = 0 the only possibility is that A > 0.
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